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SCHOOL SPEECH V. SCHOOL SAFETY: IN THE
AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE ON SCHOOL CAMPUSES
THROUGHOUT THIS NATION, How SHOULD SCHOOL
OFFICIALS RESPOND TO THREATENING STUDENT
EXPRESSION?

Richard V Blystone*

I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment is sometimes considered a "safety
valve." 1 Through expression, one's frustration is less likely to
resonate. What about student expression? What should a
teacher or principal do if they are exposed to student
expression that suggests that a student is going to engage in
violent behavior-a poem wherein a student discusses raping a
classmate, a song that contains lyrics that portray a teacher's
head being struck with a sledgehammer, or a painting that
depicts a school decimated by an explosion? Are students who
convey themselves in this manner simply expressing their
artistic tendencies, joking around, or is there real cause for
concern?
In the wake of an epidemic of violence in this nation's
schools, it is imperative that we discuss alternatives to the
present approach of how schools handle potentially dangerous
student expression. Part I of this article will address some of
the difficulties school administrators and teachers face when
weighing students' First Amendment freedoms against a
school's fundamental interest m providing a secure

'The author, J.D., 2005, Nova Southeastern University, is an associate with Moran &
Shams, P.A., in Orlando, Florida. He would like to specially thank Professor Ronald
Benton Brown, Assistant Professor Stephanie Aleong, and Jennifer Kopf for their
guidance and contributions on this project.
1. E.g. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 8:32, S:iG (D.Conn. 1970).
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environment that is conducive to learning. Part II of this article
addresses national statistics on school violence. Part III of this
article addresses "leakage"-the concept that students often
leave clues that forecast that they plan to engage in future
violent acts. Part IV of this article addresses the true threat
doctrine; and the author explains that upon establishing that
student expression represents a true threat, school
administrators can and must act quickly and decisively to
preempt future violence, even where a student has engaged in
otherwise protected speech. Part V of this article introduces the
Tinker standard and its progeny, which provide an alternative
basis for intervention against students who engage in
threatening expression. Part VI of this article addresses due
process concerns implicated by documenting school records,
suspending, or expelling students who engage in threatening or
disruptive expression. The author will then conclude by
arguing that given the violent landscape, school teachers,
faculty, and administrators should be given the broadest
discretion permissible under the law to intervene when student
speech is perceived as threatening or disruptive.
II. THE INCIDENCE OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE

National statistics indicate that the incidence and severity
of school violence is something with which we should be vitally
concerned. In 2004-2005, there were thirty-nine school-related
violent deaths. 2 In 2001, two million nonfatal acts of school
violence were directed at students between twelve and eighteen
years of age; and between 1997 and 2001, teachers were the
victims of approximately 473,000 violent crimes.:l But this is
nothing new. In fact, a school safety survey conducted by the
National Institute of Education in 1978 revealed that nearly
13% of the approximately 55,000 students and teachers
surveyed were victimized in a given month. 4
Though the incidence of school violence has always been a
matter of concern, the method of violence occurring in schools
2. Nat'! Sch. Safety & Sec. Servs., School-Associal<•d lkaths: :2004-4005. http://
www.schoolsecurity.org/tn•nds/schooLviolence04-0ii.html (last visitt•d May :10. 2007).
3. J.F. DIWm: ET J\L., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. & U.S. lh:l'''l' OF ,JlJSTICE. NCES 2004004. lNIJICATOI\S OF SCHOOL CmME AND SAFETY: 200:1. at v, ix (200:l).
4. David C. Anderson, Curriculum, Culture, and Col!l/1/.ll.nity: The Challeng·(' of
School Violence, 24 CRIMI•: & ,JUST. iJ17, 320-21 (199/i).
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has drastically changed. In many respects, the use of handguns
has replaced name-calling and fist-fighting. In 1988, a
deranged man in Stockton, California killed five children and
injured twenty-nine others when he fired an assault rifle into a
schoolyard. 5 In 1998, two middle school students carried out a
deadly shooting spree at their school in Jonesboro, Arkansas,
which left four of their peers murdered. 6 The nation wept after
two teenagers walked into Columbine High School on April 20,
1999 and slaughtered one teacher and twelve classmates. 7 In
2005, a high school student went on a rampage at Red Lake
High School in Minnesota, leaving eight more of this nation's
youth slain. 8 And as this article was being edited, Cho SeungHui took the lives of at least thirty-two people on the campus of
Virginia Tech, in what is considered the deadliest school
shooting in United States history. 9
Ill. LEAKAGE

In the aftermath of occurrences such as these, the
Department of Education, the Secret Service, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation undertook a study of school violence to
provide guidance in future threat assessment. 10 While no
single perpetrator profile was identified, the FBI did confirm
that students often left clues in the form of letters, essays,
poems, stories, song lyrics or drawings, which for lack of a
better term, foreshadowed their violent acts.ll The FBI
referred to these indicia of violence as "leakage;" and reported
that since Columbine, careful response to leakage has foiled

fi.

Id. at

:n9.

(i. See K.enneth l!c>ard, Killer's Essay Haunts Westside Teacher, ARK. DE~lOCRAT
GAZETTE, .June G, 199~1. at AL

7. See Troy Eid, Chief Counsel to Colorado Governor Bill Owens, Remarks at
News Conference on the Law and the Columbine High School Shooting (Aug. 1 :i. 1999)
(transcript available at 1999 WL (-i12147).
H. See Mara Gottfried & Shannon Prather, 'A Deep, Deep l'ain': Community
Griet•es for Those Lost Alter School Shooting Leat]('S 10 Drad: School Shooting Stun Red
Lalic. GJ{_.;:-m FOHKS 111-:IL\LD. Mar. 23, 200ii, at Al.
9. Liza l'orteus, /<(yfeml Oflicials: At Least 32 /Jcad after Virginia Tech
Untt•ersity Shootint;. FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 1G, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0.29:l:l.26631 O.OO.html
10. Sec Sarah K RcdfiPld, Threats Made, Threats }'used: School and .Judicial
Analysis in Need of Redirection. 200:1 I3YU EllUC. & L .•J. 6fi:l, 712 (200:l).
11. Jd.
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several intended school killings. 12
One legal implication of leakage is that if schools do punish
a student for speech that is indicative of future violent or
disruptive behavior, the student may allege that his or her
First Amendment rights
were violated. 13 In turn,
schoolteachers and administrators often suggest that there is
nothing they can do about student speech that concerns them
unless and until a student or teacher is explicitly threatened. 14
For instance, Professor Lucinda Roy of Virginia Tech relayed
her concerns to campus police after Cho Seung-Hui "displayed
anti-social behavior in her class and handed in disturbing
writing assignments." 15 She later commented that authorities
"hit a wall" in terms of what they could do since Seung-Hui had
not made a "viable threat to himself or others." 16 One
possibility would have been to suspend Seung-Hui after he
turned in the disturbing writing assignment as a sort of
"cooling off period" or so that he could be referred to a mental
health practitioner for an evaluation. This issue then becomes
whether a perpetrator such as Seung-Hui would have a viable
basis to assert a First Amendment violation on the basis that
he was suspended as a result of what he expressed.
To withstand students' First Amendment claims, school
boards must show one or more of the following: (1) the student
speech constituted a "true threat"; 17 or (2) by engaging in
threatening or disruptive speech, the student substantially or
materially interfered with the workings of the school; 18 or that
(3) the student speech impinged upon the rights of other
students to be secured and let alone; 19 AND that (4) where
practicable, the school board adhered to procedural guidelines
prior to suspending or expelling the student, or documenting
his or her permanent record. 20

12. ld.
1:;. Anne Dunton Lam, Student Threats and the First Amendment, Sell. L. BULL.,
Spring 2002, at 1, 2.
14. Matt Apuzzo, Va. Tech Stunned by Images of Gunman, ABC NEWS, Apr. 19,
2007. http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=3055894.
10. ld.
1(). ld.
17. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
18. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 39:i U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
19. ld. at 508.
20. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975).
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TRUE THREATS

When Uttered in a School Setting, True Threats Are
Unprotected by the First Amendment

Although the First Amendment ensures that Congress
"shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," there
are several classes of communication that fall outside First
Amendment protection. 21 Some examples of unprotected
speech include obscenity, child pornography, libel, and
"fighting words." 22 Threats of violence are also unprotected.
This "protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence, from the
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that
the threatened violence will occur." 23 Perhaps nowhere is the
need to protect individuals from threats of violence more
necessary than on school grounds.

1. The schoolhouse gate
Although students do not "shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," 24
the rights of school children within the school environment are
not "automatically co-extensive with the rights of adults in
other settings." 25 Schools need not tolerate speech that is
inconsistent with the school's educational mission, 26 that is
vulgar and offensive to the fundamental values of education, 27
that substantially interferes with the work of the school, 28 or
which impinges upon other students' rights. 29 Thus, there is
certainly a basis to temper student speech in the school

21. U.S. CO:--JST. amend. I.
22. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (noting that
there are certain types of speech, including expression, "which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" for which "the
prevention and punishment ... has never been thought to raise any constitutional
problems").
2:1. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); see Watts v. United
States. 394 U.S. 705. 707 (1969).
24. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :39:1 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
25. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 47/l U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
2G. ld. at 685.
27. ld. at 685-HG.
2tl. See Tinker, :39:1 U.S. at 509.
29. Id.
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setting. 80 In fact, "[t]he concern for student safety 1s
particularly high now in view of recent episodes of school
violence" and ''[w]hen a school district learns of a potential
threat by a student, it not only has a right but a duty to
investigate the circumstances.":ll
2. Non-arbitrary intrusion on First Amendment freedoms
Even in the face of episodes such as Columbine and
Virginia Tech, administrators do not have unbridled discretion
to respond to student expression that alerts them to the
possibility of future violence. Courts are unlikely to uphold a
school's decision to suspend, expel, or document a student's
permanent record unless the student speaker has
communicated a "true threat.":12 The seminal Supreme Court
case that established the true threat doctrine was Watts v.
U.S. :n In Watts, the defendant was arrested during a public
rally near the Washington Monument after he unwittingly
statt~d to an undercover Army Intelligence Corps officer that "if
they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in
my sights is L.B.J.":14 On the basis of his statement, the jury
found Watts guilty of committing a felony for "knowingly and
willfully threatening the President" of the United States.:35 By
a two-to-one vote, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the trial court's
decision. 86 However, the Supreme Court reversed. 87 In
reversing the conviction, the Court announced four factors that
must be considered by courts in their determination of whether

:10. See, e.g, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, :nil at 57:3 (stating that threatening
exprc>ssion is "of such slight social value ... that any benefit derived from it is clearly
outwl,ighed by thl• social in ten, st. in order and morality").
:n. Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 00-10:14-WEB, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5389, at *12 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000); see also D.G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No.
OO-C-lHi14-E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at *12 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2000) (arguing
that whrether a t.rm• threat exists should be decided against the backdrop of violence in
schools today).
:12. In re Douglas D., 62(i N.W.2d 72Fi, 7:!9-40 (Wis. 2001); see also Watts v. U. S.,
394 U.S. 705, 70~ ( 1969); Virginia v. Black. 5:18 U.S. :14:1, :159 (200:1) (discussing the
Watts definition of "true threat").
:J:L Watts, :191 U.S. at 706.
:J<I. !d.
:15. Jd.
:Hi. Jd.
:n. Id. at 70li. 708.
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a true threat exists. The four factors are the reaction of the
listener, the conditional nature of the threat, the extent to
which one's speech is mere political hyperbole, and the overall
context and background circumstances of the expression. :JH

B.

Applying Watts to the School Setting

The determination of what constitutes a true threat is
arguably more complicated in a school setting than in other
settings due to the variety of information that school officials
have at their disposal. Factors that school officials might
consider before acting on a perceived threat include the age
and maturity of the student speaker, his or her past academic
record, whether the expression was directly communicated to
the object of the threat or some third person, whether the
speaker intended to carry out his or her threat, other instances
of school violence in the community, and whether the
recipient's response to the expression was reasonable.
However, various legal questions can arise about the extent to
which these factors can and should be considered.

1. The reasonableness standard
Since Watts, courts have struggled to find a workable
standard of the true threat doctrine, which can easily be
applied in a school setting. For example, the Seventh Circuit
focuses on "whether a reasonable speaker would foresee that
the recipient of [his or her] words would take the statement
seriously." 39 Conversely, courts such as the Fourth and the
Fifth Circuit assess whether a true threat exists according to
how a "reasonable recipient" would view the expression. 40
Perhaps this is an illusory distinction. It appears that
regardless of how it applies the test, each Circuit gives some
consideration to the perspective of both the speaker and the
recipient. Inevitably, a juror will consider both whether he
would have feared for his personal safety under the
circumstances, and whether he would expect someone to be
legitimately frightened if he had uttered the same words as the

:)H. ld. at 707-0i:l.
:19. United States v. Saunders, 166 F.:Jd 907, 913 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Pacione, 950 F.~d 1:)48, 1355 (7th Cir. 1991).
40. United State's v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 891 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Daugenhaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1971).
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defendant. Often the most difficult aspect of applying the
reasonableness standard to school speech, regardless of how it
is interpreted, is determining what constitutes "reasonable"
from the perspective of a school-aged child or adolescent.

2. The ambiguities of intent
It is clear that threatening expression "intentionally or
knowingly communicated" to the object of the threat loses First
Amendment protection. 41 Some courts have also held that
threatening expression loses protection where it is
communicated to a third party rather than to the object of the
threat. For instance, in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School
District, a middle school student drafted letters wherein he
expressed a desire to molest, rape, and murder his exgirlfriend.42 The student did not give a copy of the letters to his
ex-girlfriend. 43 However, some weeks later, the student's friend
found one of the letters and told other students about it. 44
Eventually, the student's ex-girlfriend learned of the letter
through a third party, became upset, and notified school
officials. 45 Her school principal recommended that the author
of the letters be expelled for violating a school district rule that
prohibited students from making terrorizing threats. 46 The
Eighth Circuit held that the letters did in fact constitute a true
threat. In making its determination, the court considered the
issue of whether there was sufficient evidence of intent to
communicate the threat where the author simply allowed a
friend to read the letter, but did not give the letter to his exgirlfriend. The court concluded that this was sufficient because
the author knew his friend was likely to tell the ex-girlfriend
about the letter's content. 47

---~

-·------

41. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., No. 04-30162, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
25550, at *15 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2004); Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306
F.:id 616, 624 (Rth Cir. 2002) (en bane).
42. Id. at 619.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 620.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 624; sec also U. S. v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, s:H-32 (lOth Cir. 1986)
(affirming conviction where defendant made statement to a third party, threatening to
kill the President of the United States).
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In addition to the above, the Supreme Court has held that
the originator of the threat need not actually intend to carry
out their threat, or have the means or ability to carry out their
threat, in order to be prosecuted for making a threat. 48 As an
example, in Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes discussed
a hypothetical involving a patron who walks into a crowded
theater and falsely shouts, "Fire!" 49 He then determined that
falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater was not protected
speech. 50 The basis of his determination was that it did not
matter that the speaker had no intention to set the theater
ablaze because by uttering the word "Fire!" he or she would
necessarily create a clear and present danger, which would
make the other theater patrons feel unsafe.51
The same can be said of a student who wears a t-shirt,
writes a poem, draws a picture, or drafts song lyrics that
convey to another student or teacher that they should fear for
their personal safety. Once the speaker's message is conveyed,
whatever the form, the damage is done, especially in a closed
setting such as a school. More than in other settings, a threat
conveyed on a school campus can have long-lasting effects
because at school, the recipient of the expression cannot simply
leave the premises and is likely to run across the speaker the
next day or sometime in the very near future. The recipient's
only practical recourse may be to notify a teacher and hope that
action is taken.

3. The conditional nature of the threat
Courts also consider the conditional nature of a threat in
determining whether a true threat exists, and whether a school
official has acted properly.5 2 By definition, something that is
conditional is "contingent upon some event or action." 53 The
rationale behind applying this factor to true threat analyses is
that where a speaker premises his or her threat upon the
occurrence of some other event, the threat is less likely to
48. Schenck v. U. S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (2002).
49. Schench. 249 U.S. at 52.
50. Id.
51. !d.
52. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
5~1. Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. &
POL'Y 283, 340 (2001).

208

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2007

materialize. 54 As such, a conditional threat is deemed less
likely to constitute a viable danger. 55 However, "conditionality"
is a somewhat muddled distinction. Arguably, threats are by
their very nature conditional. 56 Because of this, whether a
threat is conditional can be a difficult factor for school
administrators to interpret. 57 Imminence of a threat or the
likelihood that a threat will be carried out is not often clearly
defined, especially in an atmosphere involving teenagers or
young school children.

4. Form of the expression
"[A] threat must be distinguished from ... constitutionally
protected speech." 58 It is impermissible to punish students for
innocuous talk, attempts at jest, or speech that conveys mere
political hyperbole. 5 9 For example, in In re Douglas D., Douglas
D. wrote a story in his creative writing class that described a
student cutting off his teacher's head with a machete. 60
Douglas D. turned the story in to his teacher, who feared for
her safety and reported the incident. 61 The state of Wisconsin
ultimately prosecuted and convicted Douglas D. under a
disorderly conduct law. 62 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
overturned the Wisconsin Court of Appeals conviction on the
grounds that the story contained "hyperbole and attempts at
jest" and should not have been taken seriously. 63 For instance,
Douglas D. had indicated to the court that when used in the
poem, the title "Mrs. C" stood for the fact that his teacher was a
"crab." 64 However, in a very spirited dissent, Wisconsin
Supreme Court Justice Prosser responded to the hyperbole and

54. ld. at 341.
55. See id.
5G. Matthew G. Martin, Comment, True Threats, Militant Actiuists, and tfw First
Amendment. 82 N.C. L. REV. 2SO, 2S5 (200:l).
57. Sec, e.g, Hothman, supra note 5::l, at 340.
5S. Watts v. United States, :394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
59. U. 8. v. Miller, 115 F.:ld 361, 36:l (6th Cir. 1997). However, even ambiguous
statements may he a basis for violation of a criminal-threat statute. See In re Hyan D.,
12:l Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 198 (2002) ("To constitute criminal threat, a communication
need not be absolutely unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific.").
60. In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, ?a0-31 (Wis. 2001).
()1. ld.at7::ll.
62. I d.
6:l. ld.at741.
64. ld.
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jest argument by citing an incident in Winterstown,
Pennsylvania, which occurred while In rc Douglas D. was
pending, where a man did in fact injure nine people at school
with a machete. 65 Justice Prosser went on to state, "Macabre
writings may reflect a harmless fantasy life. Then again, they
may be a true threat." 66 The essence of Justice Prosser's
dissent was that schools themselves, not courts, should be the
ones to interpret a student's expression and determine how to
treat it. 67
Students, like just about anyone else, usually express
themselves in the form with which they feel most comfortable.
If a student is an artist who likes drawing cartoons, he or she
may use that medium to express rage. If a student is a writer,
he or she may draft a fictional children's story to indicate
angst. Teachers and faculty members are in the best position to
determine whether a true threat exists. It is they who have
relevant knowledge of how a particular student behaves from
day to day. 6 1l School officials also have the advantage of
familiarity with a student's record, family situation, and other
aspects of a student's life that may help them to more
accurately interpret potentially threatening behavior. 69 School
officials should be permitted to take expression in any form
seriously, and to intervene, even if it is not clear from the form

65. !d. at 7G(i (Prosser, .J., dissenting) (citing Pc>ter .Jackson. Machete Attach at
:ichool Injures 8 Adults, (j Childrm, PlTTSBURC;H POST·G.\ZETTE. Feb. :l. 2001. at Al).
66. !d. at 7:iH (Prosser. ,J., dissenting).
67. !d. at 762.
68. School administration must be afforded substantial authority to deal with
threatening behavior. See Epperson v. Arkansas, :19:l U.S. 97. l04 (1968) ("By and
large, public education in our Nation is committed to thP control of state and local
authorities."); SC(' also LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 2G7 F.:ld 9Hl' mJ2 (9th Cir. 2001)
(reviewing with dd'erencc schools' decisions in contwction with thP safety of their
students, even when fre(,dom of expression is involved); In rc /)ouglcts D., 626 N.W.2d
at 75S (Prossc>r, ,J., dissenting) (arguing that school disciplim• generally should remain
the prerogative of our schools and that "the facts are best dl'tPrmim•d by fact-finders on
the scene, not appellate judges"). In Wood u. Strickland. -!20 U.S. :lOS. :126 (1970)
(citation omitted). the Supreme Court stated:
Given the fact thcere was evidence supporting the charg(' against respondents. the
contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is improvident. lt is not the role of the
federal courts to set asidP decisions of school administrators which the court may
view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. Public high school students do
have substantive and procedural rights while at school. Rut, Section 1983 does not
extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiat·y questions arising in
school disciplinary proceedings ....
69. See ln re Douglas IJ., 62G N.W.2d at 752-5:1 (Prosser,,)., dissenting).
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harboring true violent

C. Documenting Threatening Expression
If students are punished for engaging in threatening
expression, one avenue of recourse is to petition a court to
enjoin their school district from referring to the incident in
their permanent school record. 7 Courts are likely to grant
injunctive relief if the school is unable to show that the
expression constituted a true threat or if the student is able to
show that the school failed to adhere to procedural guidelines
prior to documenting the incident. 71 But granting students
relief such as this could have disastrous results.
Documentation does more than deter or punish the implicated
student; it also ensures that educators, school psychologists,
and parents are informed that the student in question might
have social or behavioral issues that should be addressed. 72 As
a student advances in grade level or changes schools, a record
of prior behavior forewarns school administrators to take any
deviant behavior seriously. 73 If courts make a habit of
enjoining schools from documenting student records, the result
is that school boards, principals, and teachers will be dissuaded
from keeping thorough records, which will only increase the
likelihood that future indications of violence will go unnoticed.

°

V. TINKER AND ITS PROGENY
The true threat doctrine set forth in Watts provides only

70. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 2f>7 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2001); Boim v.
Fulton Co. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.l:05CV2836MHS, 2006 WL 21897a:l. at *2, 5 (N.D. Ga.
2006); Ponce v. Socorro. Indep. Sch. Dist., 432 F. Supp.2d 682, 687 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
71. See La Vine, 257 F.3d at 992 (noting that once the school had permitted the
student to "return to classes and had satisfied itself that [the student] was not a threat
to himself or others," the maintenance of negative documentation in the student"s file
was no longer appropriate); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 56f>, 567, f>72 (1975)
(affirming district court's order "enjoining the [school] administrators to remove all
references to such suspensions from the students' records" because students "were
temporarily suspended from their high schools without a hearing either prior to
suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter").
72. See Lisa M. Pisciotta, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment
Framework for Educators Who Seek to Punish Student Threats. 30 SETON HALL L. REV.
6:35. 667 (2000).
73. /d.
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one basis for upholding a school official's decision to punish a
student for engaging in threatening expression. In TinJ.cer u.
Des Moines Independent School District, the Supreme Court
delineated another. Specifically, it held that expression that
substantially and materially disrupts a school environment is
also unprotected by the First Amendment. 74 To illustrate what
constitutes a "substantial and material interference," the
Tinker Court compared two cases from the Fifth Circuit. In
Burnside u. Byar::;, the Fifth Circuit enjoined a high school from
enforcing a regulation that forbade students from wearing
"freedom buttons." 75 On the same day, in Blackwell u.
Issaquena County Board of Education, the same panel declined
to enjoin enforcement of the same regulation at a different
school. 76 The difference was that the school board in Blackwell
showed that the students wearing freedom buttons caused a
disturbance in the school by harassing students who chose not
to wear the buttons. 77 The showing of harassment was the
key. 78 Drawing the Tinker holding out to its logical conclusion,
it appears that expression that targets a person or group of
persons, as opposed to open-ended statements against society,
for instance, is more likely to cause a punishable substantial or
material disruption. 79

A.

The Practical Erosion of the Tinker Standard

As courts started to apply Tinker, it became clear that
additional guidance was needed. In La Vine u. Blaine School
District, the Ninth Circuit provided some much needed latitude
to school officials. James La Vine, an eleventh grade student,
wrote a poem entitled "Last Words," which involved his
examination of the thought processes of a student who murders
his classmates. 80 The poem read in pertinent part as follows:

71. :393 U.S. 50:1, 505 (1969); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 181 U.S. 260,
266 (19H8).
75. 363 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1966).
76. :363 F. 2d 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1966) (Freedom buttons depicted a black and
white hand joined together and the word "SNCC," which stood for Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee).
77. ld. at 753--54.
7H. See id.
79. La Vine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F. :3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Karp
v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973)).
HO. ld. at 9H:1.
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I pulled my gun, from its case, and began to load it. I
remember, thinking at least I won't, go alone, as L jumpped
[sic) in, the car, all I could think about, was I would not, go
alone. As I walked, through the, now empty halls, 1 could feel,
my hart [sic] pounding. As I approached, the classroom door, I
drew my gun and, threw open the door, Bang, Bang, BangBang. When it was all over, 28, were, dead .... 8 1

The Ninth Circuit held that the Blaine School District did
not violate La Vine's First Amendment rights when it expelled
him on an emergency basis after La Vine showed his teacher
the poem. 82 It concluded that it was sufficient that the poem
contained images of violent death, suicide, and the shooting of
fellow students. 8 :1 The principal of James La Vine's school had
appropriately considered
La Vine's
"suicidal
ideations,
disciplinary history, family situation, recent break-up with his
girlfriend," and a recent school shooting in a nearby city before
deciding to expel him. 84 In essence, the Lavine court adopted a
"totality of the circumstances" approach for evaluation of
schools' decisions and stated specifically that school officials
should not be required to wait until disruption occurs before
they may act. 85
One cannot help but wonder what would have happened if
the "totality of the circumstances test" was applied in the cases
of Columbine or Virginia Tech. That said, the test has been met
with some criticism. 86 The argument is that allowing school
authorities to use the totality of the circumstances approach

Jd.
!d. at 992.
S''"· Id. at 9>10.
84. ld. at 991.
SG. ld. at 91l9 90 ("Whl'n the school officials madl> their d<>cision not to allow
[stuckntj to attend class on Monday morning, they Wl'l't' aware of a substantial number
of facts that in isolation would probahl~· not have warranted their response>, but in
combination gan' them a rea,.;onable basis for their actions."): see ulso In rc A.S .. 626
N.W.2d 712, 720 (Wis. 2001) (schools can forecast the> likelihood of disruption based
upon past experi"nce in the school, curn,nt events influencing st.U<k,nt activitir>s and
behavior, and other instances of actual or· threatl'tH'd disruption relating to the
exprPssion in qul•stion).
SG. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279 F.:ld 719, 72,1 (9th Cir. 2002) (Klc,infelcl. ,J.,
dissenting) ("ThP panel decision creates a nl'W First Amendment rule: when• school
officials perceive a major social concern about school safdy, tlwy may punish school
childn'n whose speech gives ri,.;e to a concern that they may he clangl>rous to
themselvc>s or otlwrs. even though the spl,ech is not a threat, disruptive. defamatory,
sexuaL or otherwise within any previously recognizl'd category of constitutionally
unprotected speech.").
81.
H~.
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provides them with too much power. For instance, some
scholars are concerned with the fact that school officials might
abuse their discretion by manufacturing a set of circumstances
that would somehow warrant the imposition of a punishment
against a student who, for example, hands in a suspicious
writing assignment, which could arbitrarily encroach upon that
student's First Amendment rights. 87 However, given that
students are dying at alarming rates in egregious fashion, it
does not appear that faculty members have the luxury of
waiting to act. To put it another way, the damage one
overzealous principal could do is certainly outweighed by the
havoc left by one student gunman.

B. Students' Right to Education Should Not Be Obstructed
The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed its concern
over the right of students "to be secure and to be let alone" and
to be given the freedom and ability to learn.H 8 In Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, it held that "students must always remain
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity
and understanding."i'l 9 Justice Brennan spoke of a student's
right to learn as being an integral part of the educational
system. 90 Justice Fortas stated that these rights are held by
the student and are not to be impinged upon by other
students. 91 In Ambach v. Norwick, Justice Powell stressed the
importance of public schools in preparing children for
"participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values"
of a democratic system. 92 And in Board of Education v. Pica,
Justice Brennan noted that there is a substantial community
interest in the promotion of respect for authority and for
traditional social, moral, and political values, and this interest
is best represented by the school board in their capacity to
teach and discipline students. 93

87. David L. Hudson. Fear of Violence in our Schools: Is "Undifferentiated Fear"
in the Age of Columbine Leading to a Suppression of Student Speech?, 42 WASHBUI{N
L .•J. 79. 80 81 (2002).
8S. !d. at 508.
89. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, :l85 U.S. 5S9, 60:3 (1967) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, :354 U.S. 234. 250 (1957)).
90. !d.
91. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist .. :39:3 U.S. 50:i, 509 (1969).
92. Ambach v. Norwick. 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
9:i. Bd. of Educ. v. l'ico, 457 U.S. 85.3. 864 (1982).
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If handled appropriately, school administrators' response to
expression that impinges upon the rights of other students will
illustrate to students that interference with the school's most
basic values will not be tolerated. This necessarily reinforces
the ideal that students must consider what they say in the
context of their environment and the listeners who may be
affected. To that end, courts should give their "full support and
approval to the actions of school administrators who take
appropriate action to protect and educate their students in a
disciplined environment that is safe and conducive for
learning." 94

VI. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
The right to a public education is a property interest
protected by the Due Process Clause and may not be taken
away as a result of a student's misconduct without providing
minimal procedural safeguards. 95 Accordingly, school officials
are subject to due process claims if they fail to put procedural
safeguards in place. Adequate process requires at a minimum
that students facing suspension for engaging in threatening or
disruptive expression be given some kind of notice and afforded
a hearing. 96 Notice and opportunity to be heard should
generally occur prior to the student's removal from school. 97 In
cases where prior notice and a hearing are not practicable or
feasible, the removed student should be given notice of a
hearing as soon as possible. 98

VII. CONCLUSION
"The first job of law is to provide freedom from violence and
the fear of violence that kills civilization at its roots." 99 The
mere "discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
an unpopular viewpoint" are not sufficiently disruptive to
constitute a substantial interference, but true threats of
94. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 576, 589 (D. La. 2004).
95. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
96. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 579 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., :i:19
U.S. :106. :11 :l (1950)).
97. Id. at 582-S:l.
98. !d.
99. ALFI{ED H. KNH;HT. TilE LIFE OF THE LAW 4 (1996).
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violence, material disruption, or speech that impinges upon the
rights of other students strike at the heart of basic educational
tenets. 100 To deny school authorities the broadest discretion
possible to intervene against a student who engages in
threatening or disruptive expression is not only dangerous, but
it is also reasonably likely to cause more lawsuits. With no
clear indication in the law that school administrators have the
broadest discretion available to them, punished students are
more likely to sue their local school board on the basis that
their First Amendment rights were violated.
More lawsuits, however, will not improve the environment
in today's schools. 101 As Chief Judge Wilkinson of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted, educators should be
freed from the burden of litigation and provided with a greater
role in the administration of their schools. 102 Adolescents are
still learning responsibility, civility, and maturity, and
consequently, need to grow into their constitutional rights. 10 :3
Students like Columbine killer Eric Harris, who declared on his
web site, "I am the law. If you don't like it, you die," 104 and Cho
Seung-Hui, who stated in his media manifesto, "Oh the fun I
could have had mingling among you hedonists, being counted
as one of you, if only you didn't [expletive] the living [expletive]
out of me," 105 "fail to realize that "responsibilities go hand in
hand with rights, and the former must be learned before the
latter can ever be enjoyed."106
Schools are charged in large part with instilling the values
that Judge Wilkinson described. 107 They must also be
concerned with the responsibility of keeping children safe while
on school grounds, during school hours. To undertake these
responsibilities, the First Amendment should take a back seat
while teachers and administrators are given the broadest

100. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 50:i, 509 (1969); see Watts v.
United States, :-l94 U.S. at70H.
101. See Chief .Judge .J. Harvie Wilkinson, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, Remarks at News Conference on the Law and the Columbine High
School Shooting (Aug. J:l, 1999) (transcript available at 1999 WL 612147).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Eid, supra note 7.
105. Manifesto,
Cho
Seung-Hui
(Apr.
16,
2007),
available
at
http://www .msnbc.msn.com/id/18186053/.
106. See Wilkinson, supra note 101.
107. Id.
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discretion permissible under the law to discipline students and
document their behavior. Frankly, this also means that courts
should be removed from the disciplinary process whenever
possible. Teachers and school administrators are in the best
position to make these determinations. After all, if the
alternative to giving schools more discretion is that more school
children will be lost to violence, we really don't have a choice!

